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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses a lesser-explored dimension of the 2004 EC competition reforms – side 
effects  of  the  methods  chosen  for  ensuring  Community-wide  consistent  and  effective 
application  of  the  antitrust  rules  among  national  judges  in  the  era  of  decentralised 
enforcement.  I  argue  that  the  European  Commission  and  national  competition  authorities 
appear to be assuming more traditionally judicial functions. The paper explores two examples 
where this tendency is in evidence: (a) interpretative/normative rulings: the Commission’s 
opportunity to give an opinion in a national court case; and (b) precedent-setting:  in certain 
circumstances,  decisions  of  competition  authorities  are  binding  on  national  courts.  The 
expertise  of  administrative  agencies  in  competition  law  enforcement,  in  particular  the 
historical primacy of the Commission, may be offered as an alternative source of legitimacy 
to  traditional  legal  notions.  These  developments  may  have  broader  implications  for  the 
interaction between administrative agencies and the judiciary. 
   2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses a lesser-explored dimension of the EC competition reforms of 2004 – 
side effects of the methods chosen for ensuring Community-wide consistent application of the 
competition rules among national judges in the era of decentralised enforcement.  
 
Decentralisation of enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC under the 2004 Modernisation 
Regulation
1 has led to an increase in the powers and jurisdiction of national competition 
authorities (NCAs) and national courts.
2  While it may lead to more efficient and effective 
control of competition law infringements by those bodies closest to the facts, according with 
the principle of subsidiarity, this decentralisation carries with it potentially greater risks of 
divergent application of EC antitrust rules. Such divergent application could manifest itself in 
various  ways  through  what  might  be  termed  substantive  divergence,  such  as  differing 
interpretations  of  EC competition law,  conflict  between  EC  and  national law,  or  conflict 
between  competition  and  other  policy  areas.  However,  another  aspect  of  differentiated 
application is institutional divergence between categories of enforcers – national competition 
authorities as public enforcers, and national courts in private enforcement between individual 
parties.  
 
NCAs  are  closely  linked  with  their  counterparts  and  with  the  European  Commission, 
specifically DG COMP, through the cooperation mechanisms of the European Competition 
Network (ECN), with its rules for case allocation and consistent application of Community 
competition law.
3 However, no such mechanism exists for national courts, respecting the 
principles  of  judicial  independence  and  procedural  autonomy.  To  fill  this  potential 
consistency gap, certain tools have been introduced pursuant to the Modernisation Regulation 
to promote consistent application of the competition rules by the national courts, and to bridge 
public and private enforcement of competition law. 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 04.01.2003, p.1-25, in force 1 May 
2004. In particular, the Regulation grants national competition authorities and national courts the power 
to grant exemptions under Article 81(3) EC, previously the exclusive domain of the European 
Commission. 
2 For an account of the reforms, see for example C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernization of EC Antitrust 
Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review, 537-574; D Gerber 
‘Modernising  European  Competition  Law:  A  Developmental  Perspective’  (2001)  22(4)  European 
Competition  Law  Review,  122-130;  J  Venit  ‘Brave  New  World:  The  Modernization  and 
Decentralization  of  Enforcement  under  Articles  81  and  82  of  the  EC  Treaty’  (2003)  40  Common 
Market Law Review, 545-580; H Kassim & K Wright (2007) ‘Revisiting Modernisation: the European 
Commission, Policy Change and the Reform of EC Competition Policy’, Centre for Competition Policy 
working paper 07-19; H Kassim & K Wright ‘Bringing Regulatory Processes Back In: Revisiting the 
Reform  of  EU  Antitrust  and  Merger  Control’  (2009)  special  issue  of  West  European  Politics,  D 
Mabbett & W Schelkle (eds) Managing Conflicts of Interest in EU Regulatory Processes, forthcoming 
3 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 43-53   3 
 
The  competition  regime  has  been  institutionally  led  by  administrative  agencies  pursuing 
public  enforcement  of  competition  law.  To  date  there  is  still  relatively  little  private 
enforcement in Europe. The nature of the competition regulation and enforcement system 
could  be  described  as  ‘quasi-judicial’.  This  quasi-judicial  nature  encompasses  several 
elements: investigative, decision-making and enforcement functions may be carried out by a 
single  agency;  there  are  different  types  and  configurations  of  administrative  and  judicial 
bodies making and enforcing the law; there are different degrees of persuasive or binding 
force attached to the rules they apply and make; administrative authorities have taken on more 
judicial characteristics, in terms of formality, approach to evidence, procedural rights and 
reporting  of  decisions.
4  The  European  Commission  itself  has  been  characterised  as 
investigator,  prosecutor  and  judge
5  in  its  enforcement  of  competition  policy,  and  at  the 
national level there are different models for public enforcement. In some Member States, 
courts may be involved in public as well as private enforcement of competition law. We 
therefore  perceive  merging,  overlapping,  or  cross-over  of  the  judicial  and  administrative 
spheres.  
 
It  is  this  paper’s  central  thesis  that  the  European  Commission  and  national  competition 
authorities  are  taking  on  more  ‘court-like’  functions  to  meet  the  challenge  of  potential 
divergent  application  of  the  EC  competition  rules  by  national  judges  following 
decentralisation.  This  has  broader  implications  for  the  interaction  between  administrative 
agencies  and  the  judiciary,  and  their  partnership  and  tensions.  In  a  wider  context,  new 
governance  tools  have  somewhat  sidelined  the  traditional  command  and  control  role  of 
courts.
6   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II explores the traditional roles of the judiciary as 
ultimate interpreters and ‘knowers’ of the law, and guardians of the coherence of the system. 
Section III narrows the focus to EC competition law, describing the institutional relationships 
within  its  post-2004  system  of  enforcement.  It  concentrates  on  the  links  between  bodies 
                                                 
4 The latter is a definition of juridification: see for example, L C Blichner and A Molander ‘Mapping 
Juridification’ (2008) 14(1) European Law Journal 36. In the context of competition law, I Maher 
‘Juridification, Codification and Sanction in UK Competition Law’ (2000) 63(4) Modern Law Review 
544-569 
5 See, for example, W Wils, ‘The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the 
Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2004) 27(2) 
World Competition 201-224 
6 See J Scott & S Sturm ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’ 13 
Columbia Journal of European Law (2006-7) 565-594; J Scott & D M Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law 
and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1; D M 
Trubek, P Cottrell & M Nance ‘ “Soft Law”, “Hard Law” and EU Integration’ in G De Búrca & J Scott 
(eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, 2006, Portland: Hart, 65-96   4 
representative of the judicial and administrative spheres: national competition authorities and 
national  courts;  the  European  Court  of  Justice  and  national  competition  authorities;  and 
primarily the European Commission and national courts. Section IV exposes two examples 
where the European Commission and national competition authorities appear to be taking up 
more  ‘judicial’  functions pursuant  to the  reforms:  (a)  interpretative/normative  rulings  –  I 
argue that the European Commission’s opportunity to give an opinion in a national court case, 
under Article 15 of the Modernisation Regulation, is akin to a soft law preliminary ruling 
procedure; and (b) precedent-setting – the obligation of a national court, in Masterfoods
7 and 
Article 16 of the Modernisation Regulation, not to go against a contemplated or existing 
decision of the Commission, which extends further than NCAs’ obligations not to counter an 
existing decision; and the White Paper on damages actions proposal for the binding effect of 
NCA  infringement  decisions  in  courts  throughout  the  Community  in  follow-on  actions. 
Section  V  offers  a  possible  explanation  for  this  behaviour,  namely  the  expertise  of 
administrative  agencies in  competition law  enforcement,  and  in particular the  historically 
central role of the European Commission, as an alternative source of legitimacy to traditional 
rule of law notions. Section VI concludes, finding that these traditional roles of judges are 
being assumed by the Commission and NCAs in the pursuit of (and perhaps an unforeseen 
consequence of) effective application of the EC competition rules.    
 
 
II. THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
Dicey’s doctrine of the rule of law rests on three basic principles: the absolute supremacy of 
the law  over  arbitrary  power,  or  discretion;  equality  before the law;  and that the law  be 
defined and enforced by the courts.
8 While differing in their underlying attitudes to the rule of 
law, Raz, Fuller, Hayek, Rawls
9 all to some degree observe the following characteristics: 
generality  (applicable  to  all);  promulgated  and  adequately  publicised;  prospective  (no 
retroactivity); clarity; stability; no rules which are impossible to obey; no contradictory rules; 
consistent application - all overseen by an independent judiciary.  
 
                                                 
7 Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 
8 A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) 10th edn, 1959, London: 
Macmillan,  pp 188, 193, 195 
9 L Fuller The Morality of Law 1964, New Haven: Yale University Press, 8; J Rawls A Theory of 
Justice 1973, Oxford: OUP;  J Raz The Authority of Law (1979) Oxford: OUP; F von Hayek The Road 
to Serfdom (1944), 1994, London: Routledge and Paul Kegan   5 
A central component of the judicial role is therefore to ensure coherence in the system. Here 
we  are  chiefly  concerned  with  normative  adjudicative  coherence,
10  that  is,  with  rulings. 
“When applied to a normative system, coherence is considered a feature, actual or ideal, of 
that system, and is therefore a systemic notion: a legal system is coherent if its components fit 
together, either all of them (global systemic coherence) or some of them (…local systemic 
coherence)” (Bertea 2005, 157). The latter is clearly easier to achieve (Baum Levenbook 
1984, 371). In the context of this paper, global coherence would relate to the body of EU law 
as a whole, and local coherence to EC competition law as a particular branch of law, a subset 
of EU law. A system is coherent if its parts are logically linked. Coherence is therefore a form 
of justification: for a decision to be legally justified, it must cohere with established law.
11 As 
both  Bertea  and  Moral  Soriano  show,  one  approach  of  ECJ  judges  is  “not  [to]  seek  to 
determine what the law is according to the criterion of coherence, but, rather, they try to make 
the legal system (the existing law and previous decisions) a coherent unit (or whole). By so 
doing, the legal system becomes workable and effective”
 12 [emphasis in original]. Whereas 
uniformity suggests only one ‘correct answer’ or path, coherence is a matter of degree. As 
Bertea observes, “…the pluralist nature of the Community sits poorly with the idea of unity” 
(155). Consistent application of the rules is one element of coherence.
 13 The thin distinction 
between ‘coherent’ and ‘uniform’ application was recently raised in the Advocate General’s 
opinion  in  X  BV,  a  preliminary  reference  concerning  the  admissibility  of  a  European 
Commission intervention in a national court case, where the Advocate General endorsed the 
‘global’ view of coherence as the means of achieving effective application of Community 
law.
14  Here,  ‘consistent’  and  ‘coherent’  application  seem  to  be  used  interchangeably  in 
different language versions. 
 
It  is  also  possible  to  differentiate between theories of  coherence  in  the  legal system  and 
theories  of  coherence  in  legal  reasoning  of  decisions  (Moral  Soriano  2003,  MacCormick 
1979). One means of ensuring consistent application is by arguing by analogy. According to 
the principle of equal treatment under the rule of law, like cases should be treated alike 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of different types of coherence in legal philosophy and their operation in the case 
law of the ECJ, see S Bertea ‘Looking for Coherence within the European Community’ (2005) 11(2) 
European Law Journal 154-172 
11 B Baum Levenbook ‘The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning’ (1984) 3(3) Law and Philosophy 
355-374 
12 L Moral Soriano ‘A Modest Notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. A Model for the European 
Court of Justice’ (2003) 16(3) Ratio Juris 296-323, 298 
13 See N MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1979) Oxford: Clarendon; A Schiavello ‘On 
“Coherence” and “Law”: An Analysis of Different Models’ (2001) 14(2) Ratio Juris 233-43, 236 
14 Case C-429/07 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/P/kantoor P v X BV, reference OJ C 297, 
8.12.2007, p. 23, opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi of 5.3.2009. For a fuller discussion see K 
Wright ‘European Commission Interventions as Amicus Curiae in National Competition Cases: the 
Preliminary Reference in X BV’ (2009) European Competition Law Review, forthcoming.   6 
(Rawls 1973) - comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations 
must not be treated in the same way, unless objectively justified. This is directly related to 
precedent. The judge’s role is to interpret an individual case within the framework of existing 
legal decisions and constitutional principles, by following the decisions in cases with similar 
facts (if necessary distinguishing the current case from earlier ones, expanding or limiting the 
scope of the earlier decision). In this way the judge both applies precedents from previous 
cases and creates precedents for the future. In English common law, the doctrine is known as 
stare decisis (‘to stand by that which is decided’) - precedents are authoritative and binding.
15 
Community law does not formally adhere to a doctrine of precedent. However, scholars such 
as Koopmans
16 and Komarek
17 argue convincingly that in practice it is recognisable in EU 
law.  
 
The judicial means of securing consistent application of the rules within the Community legal 
order is the preliminary reference procedure under Article 234 EC. For the purposes of Article 
234, only a ‘court or tribunal’ may address a question to the ECJ. The concept of a ‘court or 
tribunal’ is autonomous to Community law. The ECJ’s case law of the ECJ sheds light on the 
elements which define a court: the Schmid case test is whether the body is established by law, 
whether  it  is  permanent,  whether  it  applies  rules  of  law,  whether  its  jurisdiction  is 
compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, and whether it is independent.
18  
 
The inter partes criterion, implying that both complainants and respondents should be legally 
represented and enjoy procedural rights, may be weighed relative to the independence of the 
body in question.
19 Wils goes as far as to say that “Procedural guarantees for the defendant 
                                                 
15 In English law, this is also dependent on the hierarchy of the courts, and the doctrines of ratio 
decidendi (the essential reason for the decision in the case) and obiter dictum (opinion of the judge 
which has incidental bearing on the case) – only the ratio is binding.  In the magazine Punch, Miles 
Kington offered an alternative definition of judicial precedent: “A trick which has been tried before, 
successfully.” (J A Holland & J Webb, Learning Legal Rules 2003, 5
th edn, Oxford: OUP, p. 130) 
16 T Koopmans ‘Stare Decisis in European Law’ in D O’Keeffe, H G Schermers (eds) Essays in 
European Law and Integration, Deventer, Kluwer, 1982, 11-27 
17 J Komarek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in the 
Community Legal Order’ (2005) 42(1) Common Market Law Review 9-34, at 15-16. A fuller 
discussion is found in another version of Komarek’s paper, ‘Creating a Quasi-Federal Judicial System 
of the European Communities’, (2006) Institute for European Law at Stockholm University paper 
series, No. 54, pp. 32-40 
18 Case C-516/99 Schmid [2002] ECR I-4573 at 34 
19 Case C-54/96Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-
4961; Joined cases C-110-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577; Case C-17/00 De Coster 
v Collège des Bourgmestre et Echevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445. However, there 
was no ‘weighing’ in the more recent Case C-96/04 Standesamt Stadt Niebüll [2006] ECR I-03561   7 
tend to be stronger in public enforcement proceedings than in civil litigation”.
20 The case law 
on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is relevant here.  
 
There are also several elements to the compulsory jurisdiction criterion. First, it may imply 
that  the  proceedings  lead  to  a  final  decision  of  a  judicial  nature,  that  is  making  a  legal 
determination and/or imposing penalties.
 21 Secondly, it may signify that the parties have no 
other forum under law to solve their dispute. Thirdly, it may mean that it is compulsory on the 
part of the public body to take up the case or take a decision. Courts must decide cases which 
are brought before them, assuming there are no legal admissibility problems – the ruling made 
must reflect the remedy sought; whereas administrative agencies may be able to select their 
cases or decide whether or not to investigate based on resources. This is particularly true for 
competition authorities. 
 
 
The judicial role in the context of EC competition law enforcement 
In the context of EC competition law, we can make a distinction between public and private 
enforcement. The aim of public enforcement is to ensure compliance with the competition 
regime,  selecting  optimal  cases  or  investigations  to  pursue  with  the  ultimate  goal  of 
deterrence. As Wils has it, the role of public enforcement should be to clarify and develop 
antitrust prohibitions, punishing infringements. Private enforcement under EC competition 
law is based on directly effective rights of individuals.
22 Whereas public enforcement may be 
able  to  find  and  punish  an  infringement,  generally  it  cannot  remedy  this  by  giving 
compensation or a specific injunction. Importantly, rulings in private litigation only have 
effects between the parties (but may be cited as precedents in subsequent cases…). This will 
be discussed in more detail below. 
 
Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 allows Member States to decide the appropriate institutional 
structures  for  public  enforcement  of  competition  law.  This  was  partly  to  recognise  the 
existing  situations in the Member  States.
23  Three  models are  identified:  (a)  an  integrated 
agency, competent to investigate and to take decisions, with potential for judicial review of 
                                                 
20 W Wils ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’ 
(2009) 32(1) World Competition 3-26, 17 
21 First established in Case 138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975, para 4 
22 As an aside, the Crehan and Manfredi judgments, establishing a Community right to an effective 
remedy for breach of Community competition rules, can be viewed in terms of global coherence of the 
system, as they echo Francovich-style wording: C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, ECR [2001] 
I-6297; C-295/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, ECR [2006] I-06619.  
23 Commission Staff Working Paper, Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Implementing 
Articles 81 and 82 EC, National Courts in public enforcement (Article 36) [now Art 35], SEC (2002) 
408, Brussels 11.4.2002, p. 3   8 
the final agency decision before a competent court; (b) split functions, with the investigation 
carried out by an administrative agency, and the final decision taken by a court, again with the 
possibility of judicial review of the final decision; and (c) an administrative agency may reach 
a finding of no infringement, but a court must pronounce a prohibition or impose sanctions, 
with the possibility of that decision being appealed by a higher court.  
 
In these configurations, courts are involved in a public, as opposed to private, enforcement 
role,  and  are  viewed  as  competition  authorities  for  the  purposes  of  the  Modernisation 
Regulation and the Network Notice. In their private enforcement capacity, relations between 
the  national  courts  and  the  Commission  are  covered  by  certain  provisions  of  the 
Modernisation Regulation elaborated by the Courts Notice.
24 The Courts Notice applies to 
‘those courts and tribunals that can apply Articles 81 and 82 and that are authorised to ask a 
preliminary question…’ (recital 1), which links with the definition of a court or tribunal in 
Community law as discussed above. Recital 2 of the same Notice states that where a national 
court is also designated as a competition authority pursuant to Article 35(1) of the Regulation, 
cooperation with the Commission is covered both by the Courts notice and the Network 
Notice.  This  emphasises  the  potential  duality  of  the  judicial  role.  Its  significance  is  that 
Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 provides for the possibility of the Commission opening its 
own investigation and taking over a case where an NCA is already dealing with the matter, in 
certain limited circumstances. However, the Commission may not take over while an appeal 
or review is on-going in a court – “The effects of Article 11(6) do not extend to courts insofar 
as they are acting as review courts…”  (Article 35(3) and Recital 35 of the Regulation). 
Recital 35 of the Regulation states that where the public enforcement function is split, as in 
scenarios (b) and (c) described above, and a prosecuting administrative authority brings a case 
before a separate judicial authority for an infringement decision, prohibition pronouncement 
or to impose a fine, Article 11(6) only applies to the prosecuting authority. 
 
                                                 
24 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of 
the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, 54-64   9 
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Fig 1. The institutional system of EC competition law enforcement 
 
- FIGURE 1 HERE - 
 
My focus in this paper is those institutional relationships between judicial and administrative 
bodies  where  consistent  application  of  the  rules  as  a  result  of  decentralised  enforcement 
comes into play - primarily between the European Commission and national courts, and, 
secondarily, between national competition authorities and national courts. However, I shall 
briefly outline all of the institutional links within the system, as represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Commission-CFI/ECJ 
The relationship between the European Commission and the Community Courts is one of 
judicial review. Under Article 230EC a directly and individually concerned party may apply 
to the Court of First Instance for annulment of a Commission decision relating to Articles 81 
or 82 EC or to Regulation 1/2003. The European Court of Justice only hears cases on points 
of law on appeal from the CFI. Through judicial review the Community Court imbues the 
Commission with the values and standards it should use in its decision-making, for example, 
the standard of proof for finding an infringement, which contributes to systemic coherence.   10 
On appeal, the ECJ’s concern may be overall (global) coherence of competition law with EU 
law in general. 
 
This relationship is affected by decentralisation only insofar as decisions which may have 
been taken by the Commission, subject to review at the Community level, could now be taken 
at  the  national  level  by  an  NCA,  subject  to  review  in  a  national  court.  Atanasiu  and 
Ehlermann argue that this implies a qualitative impact - a higher standard of review and closer 
scrutiny of Commission decisions.
25 This is a topic for another paper. 
 
 
Commission-NCAs; NCAs among themselves 
As mentioned above, the relationships between the European Commission and NCAs and 
NCAs amongst themselves are managed within the European Competition Network. A full 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
26 Briefly, in terms of mechanisms to promote 
consistent application, according to the principle of parallel application
27 NCAs are obliged to 
apply Community competition law alongside national competition law where trade between 
Member States is affected. By virtue of supremacy of EU law, an NCA may not allow a 
practice which is prohibited by Article 81 or 82. If practice is not prohibited under Article 81, 
an NCA cannot apply stricter national rules to prohibit it (but it may apply stricter rules in 
circumstances covered by Article 82) - Article 3 of the Modernisation Regulation, sometimes 
known as the convergence rule. NCAs cannot contradict or overrule an existing Commission 
decision (Art 16 Mod Reg). Only the Commission can make a Community-wide finding that 
Article  81  or  82  is  not  applicable  to  a  practice,  which  binds  all  national  competition 
authorities (Art 10 Mod Reg).  
 
At least 30 days before adopting a decision requiring that a competition infringement be 
brought to an end, an NCA must notify the Commission, and other NCAs through the ECN, 
of its envisaged decision (Art 11(4)). In this way consistent application of the rules can be 
monitored and there is an opportunity to raise the alarm if necessary by making observations 
before the decision is adopted. 
                                                 
25 I Atanasiu & C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Consequences for the Future 
Role and Function of the EC Courts’ (2002) 23(2) European Competition Law Review 72-80, at 72-3: 
“…direct applicability of Article 81(3) EC will oblige the European courts to switch from the self-
imposed limited control exercised under the current [pre-2004] system to a normal-standard type of 
judicial review.” 
26 see H Kassim & K Wright, ‘Network Governance in the European Union: the Case of the European 
Competition Network’ (2009), based on interviews with officials in DG COMP and NCAs, presented 
in panel 2 I at this conference. 
27 Established by the European Court of Justice in case C-14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt 
[1969] ECR 1   11 
 
The Commission retains the power to relieve an NCA of its competence by initiating its own 
proceedings  under  Article  11(6),  as  mentioned  above.  The  Network  Notice  indicates  the 
circumstances where the Commission would in principle seek to take over a case: where 
network  members  envisage  conflicting  decisions,  or  where  an  envisaged  decision  clearly 
conflicts with existing case law; where an NCA is “unduly” drawing out proceedings; where a 
Commission decision is necessary to develop Community competition policy; and where the 
NCA  concerned  does  not  object  to  this  course  of  action  (para  54  Network  Notice).  In 
addition, it states that it will give reasons to all members of the network if it does purport to 
take over a case. Much was made of this provision at the time of the reform, but it has not 
been used to date. 
 
 
National courts among themselves 
As mentioned above, there are no formal links among national judges in competition law 
enforcement. There is scope for cooperation through soft fora such as the Association of 
European Competition Law Judges, but it is not linked to the Commission, and its members 
meet to exchange best practice rather than to cooperate in specific cases. The Commission 
does provide funding through calls for proposals for training judges in developments in EC 
competition law and assessing economic evidence. This horizontal judicial cooperation may 
need to be strengthened if private enforcement increases significantly.
28 More broadly, the 
Brussels I Regulation deals with recognition of judgments from other Member States in civil 
and commercial proceedings.
29  
 
 
ECJ-national courts 
The link between the ECJ and the national courts, and the primary tool for the consistent 
interpretation of Community law throughout the Member States, is the preliminary reference 
procedure. Through the doctrine of direct effect, national courts are also Community courts.
30 
The ECJ is not involved in practical day-to-day enforcement of EC competition law, but of 
                                                 
28 For a discussion of possible models for judicial cooperation, see F Cengiz & K Wright ‘Strategies for 
a European Judicial Network from the Perspective of Competition Policy’, UACES Annual Conference 
‘Rethinking the European Union’, Edinburgh, 1-3 September 2008 
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 012, 16.01.2001, p.1 
30 A-M. Slaughter,  A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Courts and National 
Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence 1997, Oxford & Portland: Hart, particularly Karen Alter’s 
contribution, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’.   12 
course is the ultimate interpreter of Articles 81 and 82 and related legislation. Again, this 
relationship appears not be directly affected by decentralisation after the reforms. Several 
commentators  hypothesised  that  decentralised  enforcement  would  lead  to  an  increase  in 
preliminary  references,
31  but  it  may  still  be  too  early  to  say  whether  an  increase  has 
materialised.
32 One potential factor in this is the opportunity for national judges to ask the 
European Commission for an opinion – discussed in Section IV below.  
 
       
Commission-national courts 
Article 6 of the Modernisation Regulation explicitly provides that national courts shall have to 
power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, in their entirety. Before the reforms, only the 
Commission was empowered to grant exemptions under Article 81(3), making it difficult for 
national  courts  to  conclusively  rule  on  a  case.  If  the  national  judge  took  the  view  that 
individual exemption was possible in the case, s/he was meant to suspend the proceedings 
until the Commission had made a decision, whilst being free to adopt interim measures in the 
meantime. Where the Commission closed proceedings by ‘comfort letter’ to the parties rather 
than by a formal decision, the national court was not formally bound but had to take that letter 
into account in determining whether the agreement or conduct in question infringed Article 
85(now 81).
33  To minimise divergence in the decentralised application or Articles 81 and 82  
(and especially exemptions under 81(3)), the convergence rule discussed above in relation to 
the Commission and NCAs - Article 3 of the Modernisation Regulation - also applies to 
national courts.  
 
The Masterfoods ECJ judgment, codified in Article 16 of the Regulation, established that 
where the Commission reaches a decision in a particular case prior to the national court, the 
court cannot take a decision running counter to that of the Commission. There is also a duty 
to  avoid  adopting  a  decision  that  would  conflict  with  a  decision  contemplated  by  the 
Commission, which goes further than NCAs’ obligations not to counter an existing decision. 
This means that where the Commission finds an infringement, it must be treated as proof of 
the existence of the infringement in national court proceedings. 
 
                                                 
31 Atanasiu & Ehlermann, n.26 above; K Lenaerts & D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition 
Law Enforcement: Judges in the Frontline’ (2004) 27(3) World Competition 313-349 
32 A team led by Barry Rodger carried out a multinational study of preliminary references in 
competition law only up until the 2004 reforms: B J Rodger (ed) Article 234 and Competition Law: An 
Analysis  2008, Den Haag: Kluwer 
33 Case 99/79, Lancôme v Etos (1980) ECR 2511, para 11   13 
Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003, provides for the European Commission’s intervention in 
national  court  proceedings.  Member  State  courts  may  ask  the  European  Commission  for 
information or for its opinion on questions concerning the application of the EC competition 
rules (15(1)). The European Commission and national competition authorities may also make 
own-initiative written interventions, and oral submissions with the permission of the judge, in 
legal  proceedings  between  private  parties  (15(3)).  This  is  discussed  more  fully  below  in 
Section IV. 
 
 
ECJ-NCAs 
As  discussed  above,  ‘competition  authority’  and  ‘court’  are  autonomous  concepts  of 
Community  law.  In  2004  the  Greek  Competition  Commission  attempted  to  address  a 
preliminary question to the ECJ in the SYFAIT case,
34 concerning a potential abuse of a 
dominant position under Article 82 EC in the pharmaceuticals sector. However, the ECJ ruled 
that the question was inadmissible (contrary to the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs) as 
the NCA was not a ‘court or tribunal’ according to the Schmid elements discussed above: 
body established by law, permanent, applying rules of law, with compulsory jurisdiction, 
inter partes procedure, independent.  
 
The  role  of  Article  11(6)  of  Regulation  1/2003  was  central  to  the  ECJ’s  ruling  that  the 
question was inadmissible. Under Article 11(6) the Greek NCA may, at least in theory, be 
relieved  of  its  competence  where  the  European  Commission  takes  over  an  investigation, 
implying  that  proceedings  initiated  before  the  NCA  will  not  necessarily  culminate  in  a 
‘decision of a judicial nature’: an element of compulsory jurisdiction. Anagnostaras submits 
an  alternative  argument  that  there  was  compulsory  jurisdiction,  in  the  sense  that  the 
investigation was initiated with the objective of reaching a final determination.
35 Also, in 
practice, the European Commission had not brought Article 11(6) into effect. 
 
The second reason for the inadmissibility ruling was that the Greek Competition Commission 
lacks the requisite level of independence to be a judicial body, structurally and operationally. 
It acts as a third party relative to the complainants and respondents before it, but does not act 
as a third party towards its own secretariat. There are hierarchical links. The ECJ found that 
                                                 
34 Case C-53/03 Syfait v GlaxoSmithKline [2005] ECR I-4609 concerning possible abuse of a dominant 
position under Article 82 in the context of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals with state intervention on 
national pricing levels. 
35 G Anagnostaras ‘Preliminary Problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: The Admissibility of 
Questions Referred by Bodies Performing Quasi-Judicial Functions’ (2005) 30(6) European Law 
Review 878-890, 890   14 
there were insufficient legal safeguards for individual members on discipline, appointment 
and dismissal. 
 
A, presumably unintended, consequence of the SYFAIT admissibility ruling is that it implies 
uneven  access  to  the  judicial  tool  of  the  preliminary  reference  procedure,  dependent  on 
institutional  structure.  Member  States  with  a  dualist  competition  authority  structure, 
categories (b) and (c) of the typology described in Section II above, are favoured. Proponents 
of allowing NCAs to address the ECJ cite a judicial economy argument – a question could be 
resolved at an early stage in the proceedings, before the issue reaches a review court. This 
would contribute to legal certainty by minimising the institutional divergence between NCAs 
and national courts. It would also reaffirm the eminence of the ECJ in interpreting EU law.  
 
Those against cite the floodgates argument – the ECJ already has a heavy workload. The 
mooted  creation  of  a  European  Competition  Court,  or  a  future  role  of  the  CFI  hearing 
preliminary references, may negate this effect. A more fundamental objection is that allowing 
NCAs, regardless of structure, to become involved in the preliminary reference procedure 
undermines the dialogue between courts. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer used his 
opinion  in  De  Coster
36  to  criticise  the  ‘unsettling  effect  of  the  intervention  of  an 
administrative  body  in  a  dialogue  between  courts’,  brought  about  by  the  shifting 
interpretations of the inter partes, independence and ‘decision of a judicial nature’ criteria 
applied to quasi-judicial bodies in the ECJ’s case law: “Article 234 introduces an instrument 
for judicial cooperation, a technical dialogue by courts and between courts…The objective of 
the preliminary ruling procedure is not, therefore, to assist an agency of the executive.” (para 
76) 
 
NCAs-national courts 
The discussion above has already touched on the different institutional enforcement structures 
chosen by Member States. In some Member States the competition authority carries out the 
investigation but the final determination on whether there is an infringement of competition 
law is taken by a designated court. In some countries the NCA may make the determination of 
an infringement but consequent penalties must be imposed by the designated court. In this 
context, the court has a public, as opposed to private, enforcement role. Beyond this potential 
public enforcement role, certain courts in all Member State jurisdictions have an appeal or 
                                                 
36 The quasi-judicial body in this case was the Judicial Board of the Brussels-Capital region, hearing an 
appeal on a tax on satellite dishes, which the complainant alleged was contrary to the freedom to 
receive television services from other Member States.   15 
review  role  towards  NCAs  (the  domestic  equivalent  of  the  Commission-CFI/ECJ 
relationship). 
 
The relationship between NCAs and national courts acting as private enforcers within their 
own domestic jurisdiction is clearly governed by national procedural rules, subject to the 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence. However, at EC level Article 15 of Regulation 
1/2003 confers on NCAs, as well as the Commission, the possibility to intervene in their 
domestic jurisdiction in court cases between private parties as amicus curiae on issues relating 
to the application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. National rules must therefore not 
obstruct this possibility. The 2004 Ashurst comparative report found that “All Member States 
at least recognise that statements/decisions by a national competition authority, a national 
court  or  an  authority  from  another  EU  Member  State  can  be  submitted  as  evidence  in 
damages proceedings although most do not consider them as binding.”
37 Some Member States 
allow for the binding effect of decisions of their domestic NCAs. In the UK, a claim may only 
be brought before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) when the Office of Fair Trading, a 
UK sectoral regulator or the European Commission has made a decision establishing that a 
competition prohibition has been infringed, and any appeal of that decision has been finally 
determined  (section  47A  of  the  Competition  Act  1998).  Section  58A  of  the  Act  makes 
findings  of  infringement  by  regulators  and  the  CAT  binding  on  civil  courts,  again  once 
appeals have been exhausted. To take a further example, in Hungary any statement on the 
existence or absence of an infringement made in a decision of the Hungarian Competition 
Authority shall be binding on a court hearing a related lawsuit (Article 88B of the Hungarian 
Competition Act). The only Member State currently to allow the binding effect of foreign 
NCA decisions is Germany under section 33(4) of the Act against Restraints of Competition. 
However, there are proposals at the European level to extend this binding effect of NCA 
decisions to national courts throughout the Community. The implications of this proposal are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
 
                                                 
37 ‘Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules, 
31 August 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf  
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IV. ASSUMING JUDICIAL/COURT-LIKE FUNCTIONS? 
This  section  elucidates  two  examples  where  the  Commission  and  competition  authorities 
appear to be assuming more ‘judicial’ functions, both of which serve to provide coherence in 
the  legal  system  and  consistent  application  of  the  EC  competition  rules:  (a) 
normative/interpretative rulings, and (b) precedent-setting. 
 
A. Normative/Interpretative Rulings 
As discussed above, a central role of judges is to ‘know’ and interpret the law. The ECJ is the 
ultimate  interpreter  of  Community  law.  The  principal  tool  through  which  this  role  finds 
expression  is  the  preliminary  reference  procedure,  which  safeguards  the  coherence  and 
consistent (uniform?) interpretation of Community law.  
 
European Commission opinions to national courts in competition cases: soft ‘preliminary 
rulings’? 
While the ECJ is the ultimate interpreter of EU law, the Commission, specifically DG COMP, 
is the primary competition enforcer in the Community. The preliminary reference procedure 
was previously the only institutional link between the national court and the EU institutions. 
In the 2004 reforms, we observe a parallel strengthening of links between national courts and 
the Commission.  
 
Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that EU Member State courts may ask the European 
Commission for information or for its opinion on questions concerning the application of the 
EC competition rules (15(1)). The European Commission and national competition authorities 
may also make amicus curiae own-initiative written interventions, and oral submissions with 
the permission of the judge, in legal proceedings between private parties (15(3). I argue that 
the Commission opinion to a national court in a competition case appears to be a sui generis 
instrument in Community law, akin to a ‘soft’ preliminary reference procedure. 
38 
 
In view of the principle of judicial independence, it may be remarkable that a judge would 
seek an opinion from the European Commission as a (supranational) administrative body. In 
this  respect  opinions  and amicus  curiae  interventions  can  be  distinguished  –  it  might  be 
expected that judges would be more responsive to the former where they themselves take the 
initiative in requesting assistance. (Indeed, the mechanism is couched in terms of assistance to 
the national court, rather than the Commission exercising its power to issue an opinion as a 
                                                 
38 This section draws on K Wright, ‘European Commission Opinions to National Courts in Antitrust 
Cases: Consistent Application and the Judicial-Administrative Relationship’ (2008) ESRC Centre for 
Competition Policy working paper 08-24   17 
Community legal instrument under Article 211 EC.) This is especially true given that judges 
can  find  existing  guidance  in  case  law,  Commission  regulations,  decisions,  notices,  and 
guidelines, while still safeguarding their independence. Nevertheless, how the Commission’s 
interpretation of the law is treated by the national judge, and consequently its legal effect, is 
relevant to both Article 15 tools. On the evidence of the opinions so far (Wright 2008), 
national courts have not raised only points of clarification or sought advice on novel issues, 
nor  used  the  opportunity  simply  to  ascertain  whether  the  Commission  has  initiated 
proceedings  in  a  case.  This  latter  point  is  encompassed  in  the  possibility  to  request  the 
Commission to transmit information. That provision for information and opinion requests 
were drafted in the same sentence of Article 15(1) suggests that the Commission did not 
intend opinions to have stand-alone legal significance. Nonetheless, DG COMP still formally 
consults  the  Commission  Legal  Service  before  giving  its  opinion,  which  suggests  it  is 
sensitive to the possibility of legal consequences arising.   
 
For its part, it is notable that in all the opinions given, the Commission indicates existing case 
law and guidelines even though the opinion mechanism was intended for situations where 
existing guidelines do not offer sufficient guidance. Due to its formally non-binding nature 
(as affirmed in the Courts Notice, para 19), the Commission’s guidance may cover economic 
and factual questions in addition to legal ones, and in that sense has a broader scope than a 
preliminary ruling. However, in some cases it does go further and opines on points of law: in 
the Lithuanian case  it commented on standard of proof, and it indicated Belgian domestic 
competition law provisions in SABAM. In the Lithuanian UAB Tew Baltija case the Vilnius 
District Court sought the Commission’s view on the compatibility with Article 86(1) and 
Article 82 of a municipality carrying out a public tender procedure for an exclusive 15 year 
waste collection contract. As well as pointing to its existing notices and sectoral decisional 
practice, perhaps more controversially the Commission commented on the standard of proof 
needed  to  establish  abuse  of  a  dominant  position,  stating  that  abuse  by  the  successful 
concession-holder  would  have  to  be    ‘inevitable  or  at  least  the  likely  result  of  tender 
conditions’
39  [emphasis  added].  This  appears  to  stray  onto  the  territory  of  judicial 
deliberation. 
  
In the Belgian SABAM case,
40 the question was whether a collecting society’s criteria for 
granting the status of grand organisateur to certain commercial users, entitling them to a 
                                                 
39 European Commission Annual Report on Competition Policy 2005, SEC(2006)761 final, 15.6.2006, 
77. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/annual_reports/2005/en.pdf (accessed 
23.2.2009) 
40 2004-MR-7 SABAM contre « Productions et Marketing », 2005/7059, Brussels Court of Appeal, 3 
November 2005   18 
rebate  of  50%  on  royalties  payable,  were  compatible  with  Article  82  or  whether  they 
amounted to unlawful discrimination under that article (82(2)(c)). The Commission referred 
to its decisional practice in the sector, rehearsing factors which can be taken into account to 
assess  whether  the  criteria  themselves,  or  their  application,  may  breach  Article  82.  But 
significantly, the opinion referred to Belgian as well as EC jurisprudence on dominance. It is 
rather unusual for a judge to be educated in this way on his own Member State’s law. Perhaps 
the Commission was attempting to demonstrate the similarity in national and Community law 
in this area, making its advice more likely to be accepted.  
 
The way in which the request to the Commission is suggested to be drafted also bears striking 
similarity with requests to the ECJ. DG COMP has posted guidance on its website
41 stating 
that the request should be limited to ten pages, and should state the subject matter of the case, 
findings  of  fact  the  court  has  already  made,  reasons  prompting  the  court’s  request  for 
assistance, a summary of the parties’ arguments, and the questions themselves in a separate 
section. This guidance, at several points its exact wording, is clearly modelled on the ECJ’s 
own  information  note  on  references  for  a  preliminary  ruling.
42  This  action  was  taken 
apparently in response to some judges who were simply sending all the pleadings in the case 
and asking the Commission to make a determination (for example, in the Spanish petrol 
cases).
43 This would suggest that in some Member States at least, there are few concerns 
about the Commission being too interventionist.  
 
In the Spanish courts there have been a number of cases on the validity of supply contracts 
between petrol station operators and oil companies. Two opinions sought reflect this, perhaps 
used as test cases. Interestingly, they were also the subject of parallel preliminary references 
to the ECJ. An obvious advantage of consulting the Commission rather than the ECJ is a 
practical  issue  of  time  constraints  –  whereas  the  indicative  deadline  for  provision  of  an 
opinion  is  four  months,  a  preliminary  ruling  can  take  at  least  a  year.  A  shorter  stay  of 
proceedings is much less disruptive to the case. For example, the Spanish Supreme Court 
referred preliminary questions in the context of the petrol station cases in March 2005, on 
resale  price  maintenance  in  exclusive  fuel  purchasing  agreements,  and  agency  contracts 
between service station operators and oil companies, in particular whether petrol stations 
                                                 
41 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/requests.html (accessed 13.2.2009) 
42 Information note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling, OJ 2005 C 143/01, 
11.6.2005, paragraphs 22-24 
43 E. Gippini Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with 
Regulation 1/2003’ Community Report to the FIDE Congress 2008, 375-483, 486   19 
should be regarded as resellers or agents.
44 The ECJ’s ruling was delivered on 14 December 
2006, at least a year after the questions put to the Commission in the same cases mentioned 
above.  
 
To the author’s knowledge, the Commission has used the amicus curiae instrument under 
Article 15(3) only twice so far.  It presented oral as well as written observations to the Paris 
Court of Appeal on the interpretation of quantitative selective distribution under the motor 
vehicle block exemption regulation (Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1400/2002) in Garage 
Grémeau v Daimler Chrysler.
45 The four-page interlocutory ruling of the Paris Court  does 
not specify the Commission’s substantive input, so it is difficult to gain an insight into why 
the Commission intervened, and why it considered it necessary to make oral representations 
in the proceedings as well as written submissions, but it centred on the French Supreme 
Courts’ earlier interpretation of the quantitative selective distribution scheme.
46 It seems the 
Commission took this as an important opportunity to step in to clarify and safeguard the 
uniform interpretation of block exemptions in the car sector following the decentralisation of 
Article 81(3). As its 2006 Annual Report on Competition suggests, the Commission’s goal 
could also have been to encourage a preliminary reference to the ECJ for a formally binding 
ruling.
47   
 
The second case, X BV v Inspecteur Belastingdienst,
48 is pending in Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal  while  an  ECJ  preliminary  ruling  on  the  admissibility  of  the  Commission’s 
intervention is sought. The question is whether the Commission can intervene on the basis of 
Article 15(3) strictly only where a national court is directly applying Article 81 or 82, or to 
secure the effectiveness of the competition rules more generally. X BV is ostensibly a tax case, 
but the firm was seeking tax deductibility of profit from a Commission fine imposed for its 
involvement in the plasterboard cartel. The Advocate General’s opinion was favourable to the 
Commission’s intervention, narrowing the issue to whether the Commission may intervene 
                                                 
44 Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía 
Española de Petróleos SA [2007] 4 CMLR 5. The court stipulated that a resale price maintenance 
clause was not covered by block exemption. 
45 Case 05/17909, Paris Court of Appeal judgment, 7.6.2007  
46 See case notes by J Philippe and F Kramer in e-Competitions, October 2007-II; and N Lenoir, D 
Roskis and Ch M Doremus in e-Competitions December 2007-I for a fuller discussion of the case 
47 Annual Report on Competition Policy 2006 Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2007) 860, 
25.7.2007, 90. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/annual_reports/2006/part2_en.pdf 
(accessed 23.2.2009) 
48 Case C-429/07 in the ECJ; Case 06/00252, LJN BB3356 in Amsterdam Court of Appeal; first 
instance in Haarlem District Court, Case AWB 05/1452, LJN AX71122, 2.5.2006. See K Wright 
‘European Commission Interventions as Amicus Curiae in National Competition Cases: the 
Preliminary Reference in X BV’ (2009) European Competition Law Review, forthcoming. 
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under Article 15(3) where it wishes to ensure the coherent application of the effects of one of 
its own decisions.   
 
Although the Commission originally announced its intention to publish its opinions on its 
website, to date it has not done so. Up until the middle of 2008, apparently 19 opinions had 
been delivered (Gippini Fournier 2008), but the author has only managed to find trace of 11, 
with  varying  degrees  of  detail. They  have  not  been  published in  the  Official  Journal,  as 
Community  instruments  are  required  to  be  under  the  Rules  of  the  Procedure  of  the 
Commission.
49 The fact that an act is published or notified – or promulgated, according to the 
bases of the rule of law -  may be indicative of an intention that it should have binding force.  
 
The question arises whether opinions to national courts under the Modernisation Regulation 
are really opinions as understood by Article 249EC. Beyond its notice on cooperation with 
national courts in the State aid field,
50 the author is aware of no other policy area where the 
Commission offers an opinion in national judicial proceedings. The opinion to a national 
court appears to be a sui generis instrument. If we categorise Community soft law instruments 
according to their function - preparatory and informative; interpretative and decisional; and 
steering instruments
51 - Commission opinions fit most comfortably into the second category. 
The Commission adopts interpretative notices and communications giving the Commission’s 
opinion  on  how  Community  law  should  be  interpreted,  often  summarising  the  European 
courts’ case law. In this way, it has a ‘post-law’ function (Senden 2005, 82). Commission 
opinions to courts in this competition law context correspond more closely to a declaration or 
communication. However, it still does not correspond easily with the definition of a soft law 
instrument establishing ‘rules of conduct’ in Snyder’s and Senden’s formulations.
52 
 
                                                 
49 Rules of Procedure of the Commission, C (2000) 3614, OJ 2000 L 308, 8.12.2000, 26. Articles 17 
[Secretary General] and 18 [Authentication of Commission instruments]: The Secretary General must 
ensure that all Community instruments mentioned in Article 249 EC are notified to those concerned 
and published in the Official Journal. 
50 Commission Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in the State Aid 
field, O J C 312, 23.11.1995, 8. A new draft notice on State aid enforcement by national courts was 
published for consultation on 22 September 2008, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/enforcement_draft_en.pdf  (accessed 23.2.2009) - see 
Part 3 of the draft. 
51 L. Senden, ‘Soft law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 1(2) Utrecht 
Law Review 79-99, 81 
52 L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law 2004, Portland: Hart, 112: ‘rules of conduct that 
are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but 
nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effect, and that are aimed at and may produce practical 
effects.’; developed from F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques’ (1993) 56(1) Modern Law Review 19-54, 32: ‘rules of conduct 
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To what extent might Commission opinions become binding? Commission instruments and 
guidance carry varying degrees of persuasive force. As Snyder suggests, a soft law act can 
become binding if one of the parties in private litigation invokes it (33). Commission opinions 
could also become binding indirectly through the national court’s judgment, particularly if the 
national court’s judgment essentially transposes the Commission’s advice. This may be likely, 
for instance, where the judge is less experienced in competition law or at judging economic 
evidence, where the court is more willing to apply an interpretation of Community law by a 
Community institution (albeit from the Commission rather than the ECJ), or for reasons of 
convenience – if the Commission’s ‘expert’ interpretation seems reasonable, there may be 
little incentive to look for an alternative. In addition, the national judge could use the opinion 
for interpretation of other, either national or EU, obligations or instruments. Whereas the 
judgment would be effective between the parties, a more universal effect could result if a 
principle expressed in a Commission opinion is then used in subsequent cases in the national 
case law.  Aside from the strictly normative effect, the practical impact of this may depend on 
the extent to which such opinions only summarise existing law, or become more novel and 
interventionist.  
 
Without publication of the opinions themselves, it is difficult to examine their application in 
the national proceedings and to assess what impact they have on coherent application of the 
EC competition rules. If the Commission were to publish its opinions, it would strengthen 
their universal effect, which is desirable if the aim is to promote consistent application of the 
rules across Member States. It would also lend greater transparency and legitimacy if the 
Commission is stepping onto judicial territory. It is submitted that any intervention having an 
effect on application of the law should be undertaken in an open and transparent way to 
counter the perception that the Commission can influence national judgments ‘by the back 
door’, particularly where it opines on points of law.  
 
While in SYFAIT the ECJ refused to answer the Greek Competition Commission’s question, 
partly as a result of its membership of the ECN, guarding the preliminary reference procedure 
as an exclusive club for a dialogue between courts, the Commission is coming over to the 
ECJ’s territory with its opinions and amicus curiae interventions. 
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B. Precedent-Setting 
This is the second area in which the Commission and national competition authorities may be 
taking  on  a  traditionally  judicial  role.  I  have  discussed  in  the  preceding  section  how  a 
Commission  opinion  may  become  indirectly  binding  through  national  court  judgements 
which  may  directly  transpose  the  advice.  A  further  related  aspect  of  the  judicial  role  is 
applying and creating precedent, that is interpreting an individual case within the framework 
of existing legal decisions and Community law principles, in turn also laying down a decision 
to be followed in the future, as discussed in section II above. In EC competition law (as in 
many  other  areas)  we  observe  ‘precedents’,  in  the  everyday  meaning  of  the  word,  in 
administrative decision-making.  In terms of applying precedent, that is following its own 
decisions which it has taken in the past, it is logical and efficient for an agency to rely on 
experience distilled through its existing decisions, without ‘reinventing the wheel’ with every 
case.  Precedent-setting  for  the  future  also  sends  message  to  firms,  contributing  to  the 
deterrence objective of the public enforcement role. However, I argue that now we may also 
be seeing precedent-setting in the narrow legal sense affecting private enforcement.  I argue 
that in a novel and potentially far-reaching development, the binding, or at least persuasive, 
force of precedent is now being exerted on courts themselves.  
 
 
1. Commission precedent-setting  
As already discussed above, by virtue of Masterfoods and Article 16 of the Modernisation 
Regulation, where a national court rules on an agreement, decision or practice under Article 
81 or 82EC which is already the subject of a European Commission decision, it cannot take 
decisions running counter to that decision. If the Commission is contemplating a decision, the 
national court has a duty to avoid adopting a decision that would conflict with it.
53 This 
obligation extends further than an NCA’s duty not to counter an existing decision - this could 
be evidence of a public over private enforcement hierarchy, or it may simply reflect the 
reality of more structured cooperation between the Commission and NCAs within the ECN. 
 
If the national court doubts the legality of the Commission’s decision, it cannot avoid the 
binding effects of that decision without a ruling to the contrary by the ECJ, according to Foto 
Frost
54 (Courts Notice recital 13). Only where the national court cannot reasonably doubt the 
Commission’s contemplated decision, or where the Commission has already decided on a 
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54 Case C-3 14/85 [1987] ECR 4199   23 
similar case, may the national court decide on the case pending before it without asking the 
Commission for information or awaiting its decision (Courts Notice recital 12). This chimes 
with the doctrine of precedent, where the judge interprets the case in line with existing law by 
following the decisions in cases with similar facts. It implies that Commission decisions may 
not only be binding on national courts in the same case with the same parties, but binding in 
other cases too.   
 
According  to  Advocate  General  Cosmas  in  Masterfoods,  there  is  no  conflict  between  a 
judgment  of  the  national  court  and  a  decision  of  the  European  Commission  where  the 
proceedings are not ‘completely identical’ (para 16). In the English case of Inntrepreneur v 
Crehan,
55 concerning beer tie arrangements between a brewery and a pub leaseholder, the 
House of Lords interpreted the Advocate General’s statement as meaning that there was a 
requirement to accept the factual basis of a decision reached by a Community institution only 
when the specific agreement, decision or practice before the national court has also been the 
subject of a Commission decision, involving the same parties. Perhaps more problematically, 
in Masterfoods the Advocate General also said that a conflict only arises ‘when the binding 
authority which the decision of the national court will have conflicts with the grounds and 
operative part of the Commission’s decision.’ It is arguable that that ‘grounds’ of the decision 
could encompass findings of fact open to reconsideration by the national judge. In Crehan, 
Lord Hoffman suggested that ‘the decision of the Commission is simply evidence properly 
admissible before the English court which, given the expertise of the Commission, may well 
be regarded by that court as highly persuasive’(para 69) [emphasis added]. 
 
 
2. White Paper proposal for binding effect of NCA infringement decision based on EC 
rules 
56 
While it contributes to the consistent interpretation of Community law in the decentralised 
enforcement system, the Masterfoods rule also implies that when the European Commission 
finds a breach of the competition rules, victims of that infringement can directly rely on the 
Commission's decision as binding proof in civil proceedings for damages. A proposal in the 
European Commission’s White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules
57 
goes beyond the existing acquis communautaire by suggesting the binding effect of Member 
State competition authority decisions on national courts throughout the Community. 
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The Commission proposes that when national courts, in actions for damages, rule on conduct 
under Article 81 or Article 82 EC which is already the subject of a final decision finding an 
infringement of those Articles by an NCA within the ECN, they cannot take decisions running 
counter to that NCA decision. This rule would put NCA decisions on a par with those of the 
Commission, with some limitations. First, it would apply only to proceedings involving the 
same infringers and same practices (clarifying the Crehan situation above). Secondly, only 
final decisions would be binding, implying that all appeals would have to be exhausted and 
time limits expired. Thirdly, it is without prejudice to the national court’s right, or obligation 
in the case of highest courts, to seek clarification on the interpretation of Article 81 or 82 EC 
by preliminary reference to the ECJ.  
 
The rationales are to promote legal certainty and consistent application of EC competition 
rules; to avoid re-litigation of issues, boosting judicial economy; and to alleviate the burden of 
proof  on  the  complainant  in  bringing  a  damages  action,  to  encourage  greater  private 
enforcement throughout the Community to complement public enforcement by competition 
authorities.  The  rule  would  mean  that  where  a  national  competition  authority  finds  an 
infringement of the EC antitrust rules, a complainant would be able to rely on that finding as 
irrefutable proof, not just as a presumption, when bringing a damages claim based on that 
breach in a national court in any Member State, without the necessity for further proof. The 
national court would not be permitted to reinvestigate the facts which led to the finding of 
infringement.  
 
Although  it  is  not  specifically  stated  in  the  White  Paper,  the  rule  could  indirectly  bring 
national courts into the European Competition Network; but arguably leaving the competition 
authorities in primary position. National judges could still contribute to the development of 
EC  competition  law  -  the  burden  of proving  causal  link,  effects of  the infringement  and 
quantum of the damages should remain with the complainant for determination by the court
58 
- but in a more limited way 
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to  stand-alone  cases,  where  a  plaintiff  brings  a  case  directly  to  court  without  an  existing  NCA 
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One view is that making NCA decisions binding on national judges would create a false 
hierarchy of public over private enforcement, and create a worrying model for administrative 
decisions over judicial rulings, threatening judicial independence.
59 The Commission plays 
down these concerns arguing that in practice, the requirement that the NCA decision should 
be final before its binding effect applies means that it would have been upheld by an appeal or 
review  court.  It  would  often,  although  not  always,  be  a  judgment  confirming  the  NCA 
decision that binds the judge hearing the civil case on damages claims.  This argument is 
obviously less strong if the decision was not appealed.  
 
The obligation not to take a decision running counter to one by the Commission applies by 
virtue of supremacy of Community law, with the decision under the ultimate control of the 
European Court of Justice – the relationship is not one of deference of the national court to 
the Commission (Komninos 2006). However, there is a weaker basis for the binding effect of 
a foreign NCA decision in the national courts of the other Member States. An analogy can be 
drawn with the Brussels Regulation on the recognition of civil and commercial judgments.
60 
Under that Regulation (article 34(1)), a national court may exceptionally refuse recognition of 
a judgment of another Member State on grounds of public policy, in particular where fair 
legal process may have been impeded.
61 It is submitted that the conditions for recognising the 
binding  effect  of  the  decision  of  an  administrative  body  should  not  be  less  strict  than 
recognition of another court’s judgment. 
 
The legal principle of res judiciata precludes relitigation of the same issue between the same 
parties where there has been a final judgment no longer subject to appeal. Identicalness of all 
parties to the NCA and court proceedings could not be required for the binding effect of an 
NCA decision to take hold, however, because the claimants in the civil proceedings may not 
necessarily have been party to the investigation and proceedings before the NCA. This lends 
weight to the argument that a decision may create a binding precedent beyond a specific case 
(see  Crehan  above).  The  situation  could  become  complicated  where  there  are  multiple 
plaintiffs and defendants, especially if they are spread across the EU. Section 33(4) of the 
German  Act  against  Restraints  of  Competition,  upon  which  the  White  Paper  proposal  is 
modelled, does not limit binding effect of administrative decisions to claims against parties 
addressed  by  the  decision;  but  there  is  anecdotal  evidence  that  German  judges  may  be 
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interpreting the provision narrowly to limit binding effect to decisions where the defendants 
have had the right to be heard.
62  
 
A perhaps unintended consequence of the proposal is an asymmetry between the effects of 
decisions of administrative bodies and those of civil court judgments. Clearly the current 
proposal for binding effect was not foreseen at the time of the Modernisation Regulation. In 
the  Commission’s  explanatory  memorandum  for  the  proposal  which  became  Regulation 
1/2003, it stated that “Decisions adopted by national competition authorities do not have legal 
effects outside the territory of their Member State, nor do they bind the Commission”.
63 The 
European Competition Network is based on a system of parallel competences, where each 
network member retains full discretion in deciding whether or not to investigate (Network 
Notice, para 5). Under Article 13 of the Modernisation Regulation, the fact that another NCA 
is  investigating  is  sufficient  grounds  to  suspend  proceedings  or  to  reject  a  complaint. 
However, it has “no obligation to do so” (Network Notice, para 22). If other NCAs are not 
formally bound by each other’s decisions, there is an asymmetry if national judges are to be 
bound by the decisions of foreign NCAs. In addition, as mentioned above, the majority of 
Member States do not provide for their national courts being bound by decisions of their own 
NCAs. It would be rather strange if national courts were bound by decisions of foreign NCAs, 
but not their domestic counterparts.  
 
 
3. Different legal effects of NCA and court judgments? 
The asymmetric legal effects of national court judgments and NCA decisions also arise in the 
context of the duty to disapply national law which is incompatible with EC law. Simmenthal
64 
affirmed that, in following the principle of supremacy of EC law, conflicting national law 
which is in force must be automatically inapplicable. Therefore, when a national court is 
called upon to apply provisions of Community law it must give full effect to Community 
provisions, if necessary refusing to apply any conflicting provisions of national law. In the 
preliminary ruling in Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi,
65 the ECJ confirmed the duty of an 
NCA  to  disapply  legislation  which  is  incompatible  with  EC  competition  rules.  As 
Kaczorowska argues, this means that a declaration of incompatibility adopted by a NCA 
produces universal (erga omnes) effects as all national courts and administrative authorities 
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considering  the  national  legislation  which  is  not  in  line  with  EC  competition  rules  must 
disapply  it.  “The  effect  of  a  declaration  of  incompatibility  is  not  limited  to  the  parties 
investigated by a NCA”.
66 However, it is not clear what the cross-border effect is – is this just 
within the Member State, or beyond? In light of the White Paper proposal for binding effect 
of NCA infringement decisions, the legal effects of the declaration would be Community-
wide. 
 
The result appears to be that a national court judgment is binding only inter partes, whereas an 
‘administrative declaration’ by an NCA may have legal effect throughout the Community. In 
that  sense  an  administrative  declaration  may  be  ‘more’  binding  than  a  court  judgment. 
Despite this, Kaczorowska submits that “…the weight of authority attributable to a mere 
‘declaration’ is not yet clear and indeed, it may be that in due course it would be the case that 
declarations achieve different levels of legal effect in different Member States.”(595)  
 
 
V. EXPERTISE AS LEGITIMACY IN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The  foregoing  discussion  suggests  a  complex  structure  of  the  ‘judicial’  and  the 
‘administrative’ after the 2004 competition reforms. Administrative competition authorities, 
principally DG COMP, appear to be assuming (‘usurping’ may be too strong) traditionally 
judicial roles. This apparent trend has consequences for the rule of law as upheld by courts. 
However, it may be unsurprising if we take into account alternative forms of legitimacy and 
new governance. 
 
Morgan and Yeung synthesise different bases for legitimacy moving beyond its tradition legal 
notions.
67  In Rules and Government (1995), Robert Baldwin’s five measures of regulatory 
legitimation:  legislative  mandate,  accountability  (to  democratic  institutions),  due  process 
(based on fair and open procedures), expertise (objective), efficiency (system and/or produced 
results  are  efficient  –  effectiveness,  to  the  aims,  and  economically  efficient).  Majone 
discusses  the  use  of  economic  expertise  by  independent  regulatory  agencies  as  way  of 
promoting non-majoritarian democracy.
68 
 
DG  COMP  had  a  long-standing  monopoly  over  competition  enforcement,  and  in  recent 
decades certain NCAs have also built up considerable expertise. What we may be observing is 
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the primacy of administrative authorities by virtue of their expertise in competition policy and 
enforcement.  The burgeoning role of economic analysis in competition enforcement may also 
militate against judges’ traditional roles. During the reform process concerns were raised that 
national judges may not have the ability to assess economic analysis and evidence.
69  
 
In the opposite direction, Maher notes that courts and other quasi-judicial bodies no longer 
simply apply clearly promulgated rules - one of the bases for the rule of law - but are also 
required to apply standards that are often open-ended. In addition, judicial or quasi-judicial 
reasoning  has  become  more  purposive  or  policy-oriented.  She  observes  that  this  sort  of 
reasoning is a feature of administrative decisions.
70 In addition, courts appear to be more 
closely scrutinising the decision-making of competition authorities in the context of judicial 
review.  At  the  Community  level,  this  phenomenon  has  been  widely  discussed  since  the 
critical 2002 CFI rulings in Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval (merger cases – but the same 
review standard is applied to Article 81 and 82 cases). While the Commission has a margin of 
appreciation where it carries out complex economic assessments, this margin seems to be 
narrowing in the case law. One explanation for this may be the perceived increasing technical 
expertise of the courts themselves. This is a topic for another paper. Suffice it to say that the 
judicial and administrative spheres seem to be crossing over. The judicial review function is a 
means of enforcing coherence in administrative decision-making.  
  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Decentralisation of enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC under the 2004 Modernisation 
Regulation has led to an increase in the powers and jurisdiction of NCAs and national courts, 
carrying with it potentially greater risks of divergent application of EC antitrust rules. While 
NCAs  are  closely  linked  with  their  counterparts  and  with  the  European  Commission, 
specifically DG COMP through the cooperation mechanisms of the European Competition 
Network, no such mechanism exists for national courts. Certain tools have been introduced 
pursuant to the Modernisation Regulation to promote Community-wide consistent application 
of the competition rules among national judges in the era of decentralised enforcement, and to 
bridge public and private enforcement of competition law.  
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This paper has approached this less explored dimension of the reforms, exploring some side 
effects  of  the  methods  chosen  to  fill  this  potential  consistency  gap.  It  has  discussed  the 
merging of judicial and administrative spheres in the quasi-judicial system of competition 
enforcement.  
 
One,  perhaps  unintended,  consequence  of  the  tools  chosen  in  pursuit  of  consistent  and 
effective enforcement is that the European Commission, and national competition authorities 
as  a  result  of  the  EC  level  reforms,  appear  to  be  assuming  more  traditionally  judicial 
functions.  
 
The paper has considered two examples where this tendency is in evidence. One traditional 
role  of  the  judiciary  is  ultimate  interpreter  and  ‘knower’  of  the  law,  constructing  and 
enforcing norms. In the domain of interpretative/normative rulings I argue that the European 
Commission’s opportunity to give an opinion in a national court case, under Article 15 of the 
Modernisation Regulation, is akin to a soft law preliminary ruling procedure. The preliminary 
reference procedure is a dialogue between courts. In the case of its opinions to national courts, 
we find that the Commission, as primary enforcer of competition law in the Community, is 
able to complement the formal judicial link of the preliminary reference procedure with a 
parallel  strengthening  of  its  own  relations  with  the  national  courts.  Its  opinions  may  be 
desirable as a means of achieving consistent application of the rules; but it is submitted that 
any intervention should be done in an open and transparent way, for example by publishing 
opinions, to counter the perception that the Commission can influence national judgments ‘by 
the back door’, particularly where it opines on points of law. While in SYFAIT the ECJ 
refused to answer the Greek Competition Commission’s question, partly as a result of its 
membership of the ECN, guarding the preliminary reference procedure as an exclusive club 
for a dialogue between courts, the Commission is coming over to the ECJ’s territory with its 
opinions and amicus curiae interventions. 
 
A connected means of achieving coherence is through applying and creating precedent. We 
see this in the obligation of a national court not to go against a contemplated or existing 
decision of the Commission, which extends further than NCAs’ obligations; and in the White 
Paper on damages actions proposal for the binding effect of NCA infringement decisions in 
courts throughout the Community in follow-on actions. This binding, or at least persuasive, 
force of precedent is now being exerted on courts themselves by administrative agencies. 
   30 
We do not know how great the likelihood and risks of divergence really are, so we have no 
counterfactual. It is very difficult to monitor every national court judgment which touches, 
directly  or  indirectly,  on  the  EC  competition  rules.  Article  15(2)  of  Regulation  1/2003 
requires Member States to copy judgments to the Commission,
71 but there is no duty on the 
courts themselves. If it is accepted that the Commission and NCAs are taking on these more 
judicial roles, how necessary is that, and do the costs outweigh the benefits? 
 
These  developments  may  have  broader  implications  for  the  interaction  between 
administrative agencies and the judiciary. In a wider context, new governance tools have 
somewhat  sidelined  the traditional  command  and control role  of  courts. The  expertise  of 
administrative  agencies in  competition law  enforcement,  and  in particular the  historically 
central  role  of  the  European  Commission,  may  be  offered  as  an  alternative  source  of 
legitimacy to traditional legal notions. 
 
A complementary judicial-administrative relationship is important for the overall success of 
the EC competition enforcement regime. In the absence of a formal judicial network, the tools 
included in the reforms may have as their primary goal consistent and effective enforcement 
of the rules. But their consequences may have a much wider reach.  
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